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Introduction
The use of prescribed ﬁre faced strong resistance from policy makers and natural resource
managers through much of the 20th century (Pyne 1982, Biswell 1989), but is increasingly
recognized as a useful tool for increasing rangeland productivity, biodiversity, and reduction
of wildﬁre risk and severity (Bernardo et al. 1988, Svejcar 1989, Briggs and Knapp 1995,
Zimmerman 1997, Babbitt 1995, Pattison 1998). The Federal government now formally
recognizes the use of prescribed ﬁre as an integral element of wildﬁre management, despite
the explicit recognition that it is among the most risky activities federal land management
agencies utilize (U.S. Department of the Interior, U.S. Department of Agriculture 1995). The
use of prescribed ﬁre on federal land is increasing as well. Haines et al. (1998) report that the
number of national forests using prescribed ﬁre increased by 76 percent between 1985 and
1994, and project further increases in use. Between January and November 24, 2000, 4,371
prescribed burns were performed on public lands, covering a total of 1,125,306 acres (Shaver
2000). Comprehensive data of prescribed ﬁre use on private lands is not readily available.
Prescribed burning is an inherently risky resource management tool. A prescribed ﬁre
set by the US National Park Service near Los Alamos, New Mexico in May 2000 resulted in
a 48,000-acre wildﬁre, destroying about 220 homes and aﬀecting about 400 families (Claims
Magazine Staﬀ Writer 2000). Litigation resulting from an escaped wildﬁre can be costly
and time-consuming as well. For example, the plaintiﬀ in a case (Lowe vs Jones et al., Case
No. CJ 95-345) tried in Osage County, Oklahoma argued for $9.3 million in damages in
a 200-acre wildﬁre that the plaintiﬀ claimed resulted from a prescribed burn on adjacent
property. No structures were burned, only grassland. Although no judgement was found for
the plaintiﬀ, legal and other fees for the defense approached $0.5 million.
In the absence of statutory law, the Common Law relating to prescribed ﬁre is generally
1based upon negligence: to be found liable for damage to a neighbor’s property, the burner
must be found to not have taken a reasonable level of precaution to reduce the likelihood of
damage to the neighbor’s property (25 ALR5th 391). Today, virtually all states have codiﬁed
civil or criminal statutory law for prescribed burning, but the structure of these laws varies
substantially across states. Only four states impose strict liability on prescribed burners such
that they are liable for the damage caused by an escaped prescribed ﬁre regardless of the
precautions they take to control the ﬁre. Most states with prescribed ﬁre statutes impose
negligence rules of some form on the prescribed burner, but again, these negligence rules
vary substantially across states.
Diﬀerent liability rules induce diﬀerent incentives for both prescribed burners and poten-
tial victims of escaped ﬁre or smoke. Using a model adapted from the law and economics
literature, we examine the incentive eﬀects of a number of liability rules commonly imposed
to address the problem of external property damage due to prescribed ﬁre, and discuss their
relative eﬃciency under various technological, demographic, and informational environments.
Not only do prescribed burning laws vary substantially across states, but these laws
currently are in ﬂux. The laws in most states have been revised since 1990, and a number of
statutes are currently under review. The intent of this paper is to provide a useful conceptual
framework for further development and reﬁnement of prescribed burning liability law. In
particular, we focus on the extent to which both ex ante regulation of prescribed ﬁre, such
as permit systems, prohibitions, and criminal penalties, and ex post liability via litigation,
are used as substitutes or complements in the management of external costs of prescribed
ﬁre use.
A model of liability for prescribed burning
Consider two neighboring risk-neutral property owners, one who intentionally applies a
prescribed burn to her land, and a neighbor whose property would suﬀer damage if the ﬁre
2managed to escape onto his land. Suppose the probability of an escaped ﬁre depends on
precaution eﬀort by the burner, and the extent of damage — given that a ﬁre escapes —
depends on the mitigation and preparation eﬀort taken by the victim. The following model
is adapted from Brown (1973).
First consider the eﬃcient (wealth maximizing) levels of precaution; we will then examine
the eﬀectiveness of various liability rules for inducing this allocation. The total net value of
a prescribed burn, Π, is the value of the beneﬁts from the burn minus the expected value of
damage and any the costs of care incurred by the burner and victim:




• R > 0 = the value of the burn to the burner,
• D(V ) = damage to the victim if ﬁre escapes,
• P(B) ∈ (0,1) = probability of an accident,
• V = the level of care invested by the victim,
• B = The level of care invested by the burner,
• W v and W b = Cost of a unit of care for the victim and burner, respectively.
V might include ﬁre-prooﬁng buildings, clearing combustible materials from around build-
ings, and evacuation eﬀort in case of ﬁre or smoke. B might include the use of inputs such
as making ﬁre breaks, and assuring water availability for any errant sparks. Waiting for low
temperature and reasonable wind conditions is an important factor that can be considered
a costly input as well.
The ﬁrst-order condition for maximization implicitly deﬁnes the economically eﬃcient
level of care for each party:
−D
0(V ) · P − W
v ≤ 0 (2a)
−D · P
0(B) − W
b ≤ 0. (2b)
3P and D are abbreviations for the functions P(B) and D(V ), and necessary curvature
conditions to ensure a maximum are D0(V ) < 0, P 0(B) < 0, D00(V )P > 0, DP 00(B) > 0, and
DPD00(V )P 00(B) − [D0(V )P 0(B)]2 > 0.
The ﬁrst-order condition for the victim is represented by equation 2a. The ﬁrst term in
the equation, −D0(V )P, is the expected value of the marginal product of care (VMP) by the
victim in terms of reductions in expected damage. A VMP curve suﬃciently high relative to
the marginal cost of care (W v) will result in a positive optimal level of victim care. A low
VMP will result in a corner solution with the optimal level of care by the victim being zero.
An analogous relationship pertains to the burner.
Three additional implications become clear from a dissection of the marginal value of
precaution for the two participants. First, when the equilibrium value of P is low, the
marginal productivity of victim care is low and it is less likely to be economically eﬃcient
for victims to expend any eﬀort preparing for escaped prescribed ﬁre. Second, if the value
of potential damage to neighboring property (D) is low, it is more likely that the eﬃcient
level of care by the burner is zero (B=0). Third, the marginal product functions D0(V ) and
P 0(B) also aﬀect the optimal level of care for each participant. If the technologies used to
reduce either the probability of escape or the extent of damage are ineﬀective or are costly,
the levels of these inputs should for eﬃciency’s sake be lower, and possibly zero. Finally,
notice that precautionary levels of B=0 and V=0 could be eﬃcient even if the expected net
beneﬁt of a ﬁre is positive.
Strict liability
The model presented above provides a framework for understanding the incentive eﬀects of
diﬀerent liability rules. Strict liability will be considered ﬁrst, followed by an analysis of
negligence rules.
With no legal intervention and no interaction between the victim and the burner, liability
for damage is in eﬀect borne by the victim. Alternatively, if the burner were required to











completely compensate the victim for damage (a strict liability rule), the victim suﬀers no
damage and would have no incentive to invest in reducing the probability of damage. Thus,
the ﬁrst ﬁrst-order condition in (2a) would only be satisﬁed if the victim had little inﬂuence
over damage to his own property, the probability of damage is low, or the costs of damage
abatement are high (D0(V ) · P ≤ wv). A strict liability rule is eﬃcient if and only if the
victim cannot eﬀectively reduce the probability of the damage occurring.
Negligence
Now consider a negligence rule, where the burner is not liable for damage if B is greater
than or equal to some standard ¯ B. For any given level of V , the expected cost to the burner
subject to a strict liability rule is W bB +D(V )·P(B). If the burner satisﬁes the negligence
rule (B ≥ ¯ B), she will only accrue her input costs, W bB. If the burner does not satisfy the
rule, her costs will be W bB + D(V ) · P(B). This cost function is represented by the thick
line in ﬁgure 1, which is discontinuous at ¯ B. In the ﬁgure, ¯ B is set to minimize the total
expected cost of the prescribed burn, which is the economically eﬃcient negligence standard.
The burner will expend just enough eﬀort to satisfy the negligence standard as long as
the negligence standard is not too high. Suppose, for a moment, that this is the case. The
burner chooses B = ¯ B, and the liability will fall on the victim. We are assuming complete
information, so the victim will know that the burner will exert just enough care to satisfy
5the liability rule. Therefore, the expected cost to the victim will include the full expected
damage of the burn, which induces the victim to exert the optimal level of care (deﬁned by
equation 2a).
To burn or not to burn
The results above relate to the allocation of eﬀort given that a prescribed ﬁre is set by the
burner. The decision whether or not to burn is also aﬀected by the liability rule. The burner
will decide to burn if the private net gains of doing so given equilibrium eﬀort levels are
positive.
Strict liability will internalize all expected damage due to both the number of ﬁres started
and the level of care (Shavell 1980), because the burner internalizes the expected damage
every time a ﬁre is lit. The victim, on the other hand has no incentive to reduce expend
precautionary eﬀort. If the victim should for eﬃciency’s sake expend precautionary eﬀort,
then the total expected costs of the burn will be ineﬃciently high. If R falls above the
minimum total expected costs given eﬃcient levels of B and V , but below the minimum
total expected costs given V=0, the burn will not be performed even though it would be
eﬃcient to do so given eﬃcient precaution by the victim. In other words, when the net
beneﬁts of prescribed burning tend to be low, a strict liability rule will tend to result in too
few prescribed burns if the victim can mitigate expected damage.
In contrast, under a negligence rule based on precautionary eﬀort, a burner may light a
ﬁre when the total costs of doing so outweigh the beneﬁts. Figure 1 shows how a negligence
rule may result in too many prescribed ﬁres. R2 represents a level of beneﬁt that covers
both the costs of care and expected damage. From an eﬃciency perspective this ﬁre should
be set. R1 covers the costs of care borne by the burner in order to satisfy the negligence
rule, so the ﬁre will be set. However, because the costs including expected damage are larger
than R1, an eﬃciency criterion dictates that the ﬁre should not be set. Thus, a ﬁre will be
set when it is ineﬃcient to do so if the beneﬁts to the burner lie between the costs of the
6optimal level of care W bB∗ and the total expected costs W bB + DP(B∗). For any given
distribution of R, this is more likely if the net beneﬁts to the burner are positive but small,
and when expected damage is large.
At least two approaches might be used to address the incentive to start ﬁres too often
under an input-based negligence standard. The ﬁrst approach is a negligence rule based on
the total net value of starting a ﬁre. This form of negligence rule is known as the Learned
Hand rule. It requires a burner to be found negligent if she ignites a ﬁre when the expected
total net beneﬁts (including expected damage) are negative, and not negligent otherwise
(Feldman and Frost 1998). An analogy to a simple model of a ﬁrm may help to clarify
the diﬀerence between these two types of negligence rules: the Learned Hand rule is like a
shut-down rule: produce(burn) if the net value of production (burning) is positive whereas
an input-based negligence rule deﬁnes the optimal allocation of resources (inputs) given that
the burn is carried out. A Learned Hand rule cannot induce eﬃcient precautionary eﬀort,
and an input-based negligence rule cannot ensure that burns will not be performed when
their net social beneﬁt is negative.
The second approach is to support the negligence rule with a priori regulation: require
burners to acquire a permit before burning. Presumably, this permit would only be issued
if the expected social net beneﬁts of the burn are positive. Acquisition of these permits
may also be contingent on proof of some level of preparation, and may be used as explicit
elements of a negligence standard if litigation ensues, thereby facilitating pretrial settlement
and minimize court costs.
The relative value of these two options (permits or the Learned Hand Rule) depends on
how costly they are to implement. If information about expected net social beneﬁts were
readily available prior to a burn, then they would likely be readily available after the burn as
well. Further, there is no clear reason to believe that more information on expected damage
would be available after an escaped ﬁre. Therefore, we must look elsewhere to explain the
structure of regulation and law.
7Prior regulation and Post Liability: Substitutes or Complements?
At least two papers have developed economic models of the tradeoﬀs and incentive eﬀects
of regulation and liability, and they each take diﬀerent approaches. The ﬁrst paper, Shavell
(1984), argues that given variation in the extent of variation in potential damage across
injurers, the simultaneous use of ex ante regulation and ex post liability can be explained
by the potential for bankruptcy and the probability that a burner will not be taken to court
even if an escaped prescribed ﬁre causes. The second paper, Kolstad et al. (1990), do not
consider bankruptcy and non-litigation, but instead base their arguments on the uncertainty
that the injurer faces about the outcome of a trial, given the injurer’s expectations about
the potential for damage.
In general, common law has relied on negligence rules rather than strict liability (25
ALR5th 391) with respect to the use of prescribed ﬁre. The question, then, is why statutory
negligence rules were adopted in so many states when common law already supported neg-
ligence rules. One possible answer follows from Kolstad et al. (1990). Their model suggests
that if there is uncertainty about the outcome of judicial rulings (“evidentiary uncertainty”),
negligence rules alone (without prior regulation) will lead to too little precautionary eﬀort
on the part of potential injurers if uncertainty about the judicial ruling is suﬃciently large.
This is the case even if judicial rulings about the negligence standard are, on average, set
at the eﬃcient level. If a statutory rule can reduce uncertainty by providing a clear set of
unbiased standards within a state by which both the litigants and the courts can judge their
actions, the ineﬃciency of a negligence rule may be reduced.
Two things are clear from a reading on statutory law for prescribed ﬁre: ﬁrst, some
statutory negligence standards appear to be designed to clarify negligence standards; second,
that uncertainty cannot be removed completely. Given that this is the case, consider now the
addition of ex ante regulation. Despite the diﬀerences in their underlying assumptions, both
Kolstad et al. (1990) and Shavell (1984) come to the conclusion that the joint imposition
of negligence rules and prior regulation can provide eﬃciency gains over the use of either
8instrument alone under certain circumstances. In particular, Kolstad et al. (1990) ﬁnd that
as long as a negligence rule alone tends to lead to too little precaution, the further imposition
of prior regulation at a somewhat lesser standard of care will tend to lead to a higher (more
eﬃcient level) of care. Thus, liability rules and negligence rules act as complements. Kolstad
et al. (1990) also ﬁnd in such circumstances that joint use of liability and regulation improves
on liability alone if the the marginal cost of care for the potential injurer is large. On the other
hand, both Shavell (1984) and Kolstad et al. (1990) suggest that if evidentiary uncertainty
is small, and/or the marginal cost of precaution is small, then prior regulation and liability
should be used separately.
Discussion
Statutory law related to prescribed burning is currently in a state of ﬂux. In the following
section we examine current statutory law in the context of our model. We begin with a
discussion of variation in law across space and time, and then look more closely at speciﬁc
statutory negligence rules and economic logic behind these rules. The discussion is motivated
by two goals: to provide an economic basis for current statutory law, and to support our
model as a prescriptive policy tool.
Table 1 includes selected categories of ﬁre liability laws and a listing of the states whose
statutes include them. The ﬁrst three categories are prescribed ﬁre liability rules in order of
increasing stringency from the burner’s perspective: 1) strict liability, (2) negligent unless
proven otherwise and (3) not negligent unless proven negligent. The latter two are diﬀerent
in that in (2) the burden of proof is on the burner (defendant) given that the burner’s ﬁre
escaped from his or her property, and in (3) the burden of proof is on the victim (plaintiﬀ).
Four states impose strict liability on prescribed burners — Connecticut, North Dakota,
New Hampshire, and Oklahoma. If a ﬁre escapes, the burner is liable for damage regardless
of his or her eﬀort to contain the ﬁre. Twenty-two states have some form of negligence rule in
9Table 1: State liability law for prescribed ﬁre and ﬁre risk.
Liability or property rule State
Burner strictly liability CT, ND, NH, OK.
Burner presumed negligent if ﬁre escapes. AK, GA, MD, OR, UT.
Burner liable for damage if proven negligent. AL, AR, CA, DE, FL, LA, MS, ME, MI,
NC, NJ, OR, TX, VA, WA, WI.
Notiﬁcation requirements ([N]=neighbors,
[A]=agency)
AR[N,A], CO[A], LA[N], NY[N], NC[N],
TN[N], UT[A].
Permits or bans supported by statute AL, AZ, CA, CO, CT, FL, GA, ID, IA,
ME, MA, MN, MS, NE, NV, NH, NJ,
NY, OR, RI, SD, UT, WV, VT, WA.
Criminal penalties for leaving ﬁre unattended
or failure to extinguish and negligent escape.
CA, MI, NJ, NM, NV, NC, OK, OR,
SC, SD, TN, UT, WI, WY.
No statutes addressing prescribed ﬁre HI, IL, IN, MO, MT.
Liable for negligently allowing uncontrolled
spread of wildﬁre
AK, DE, MI, OH, OR, PA, SD, TN, TX,
UT, VT, WA, WV.
Uncontrolled ﬁre is a nuisance: can be billed
for public ﬁre suppression costs.
CO, GA, ID, MS, NH, ME, MD, OK,
OR, WA, WI.
Regulations restricting excessive vegetative
fuel loads
MN, MT, NM, WA.
their statutory code. Six of these states place the burden of proof on burners in that escaped
ﬁre is prima facie evidence of negligence; the burner must show due care to escape liability for
the damage. Sixteen states place the burden on the plaintiﬀ to prove negligence on the part
of the burner in order to receive damages. Oregon falls in both of these categories, allowing
plaintiﬀs to collect double damages if the burner is proven negligent or single damages if
no proof of negligence and no proof of due care. Eleven states treat uncontrolled ﬁre as a
nuisance, requiring landowners to pay for the cost of ﬁre suppression by public agencies.
A number of state statutes support penalties or liability for ﬁres escaping from one’s
10own land even if the ﬁre is not intentionally set (table 1). For example, Michigan law states
that anyone who willfully allows a ﬁre to pass from his property to another’s property is
guilty of a felony. Furthermore, some states impose liability or penalties for excessive fuel
loads on their land. For example, Montana statutes focus extensively on requirements for
mitigating ﬁre hazards during timber harvest activities. Wisconsin (and other states) require
railroad companies to mitigate ﬁre hazards along railways to reduce the probability of ﬁre
from locomotive sparks.
Strict liability versus negligence rules
Our model implies that strict liability is likely to induce eﬃcient mitigation eﬀort and fre-
quency of prescribed ﬁre use if burners have most or all control over the likelihood of damage
due to prescribed ﬁre, when it is not cost-eﬀective for potential victims to reduce potential
property damage from ﬁres. As shown in table 1 and ﬁgure 2, twenty-two states explicitly
impose negligence rules and only four impose strict liability on burners. This distribution
of liability rules is consistent with a recognition by policymakers that potential victims gen-
erally have some control over the extent of damage that might be sustained as a result of
prescribed burning, despite the risk of external costs in the form of damage from escaped
ﬁre.
Negligence rules
Negligence rules vary substantially across states and across time. Statutory rules relating to
prescribed ﬁre often contain an ambiguous statement requiring “due care”, as well as more
speciﬁc rules that are necessary (but not suﬃcient) to satisfy due care.
One common speciﬁc rule, the requirement to notify neighbors, has already been dis-
cussed. The economic logic behind this rule is as follows. If landowners expect to be notiﬁed
of their neighbor’s intentions of prescribed burning, they need only be on alert for escape
from prescribed ﬁre when such a ﬁre is planned (and reported). This undoubtedly lowers
11Figure 2: Liability rules for prescribed ﬁre in the United States
their overall mitigation costs, because time-sensitive mitigation of potential damage (clearing
dry vegetation near a house that might contribute to the extent of damage, for example)
may then be performed only when the potential for an escaped prescribed ﬁre exists, and
need not be applied at other times. Furthermore, the cost to a burner of notifying adjacent
landowners is likely to be relatively low. As a result, notiﬁcation of neighbors will reduce
the overall expected costs of a prescribed burn.
Another common speciﬁc requirement that burners must remain with the ﬁre until it is
completely extinguished (“dead out”). The cost to a landowner (or the landowner’s agent)
for remaining an additional hour or day on a burn sight is likely be relatively low compared
to the expected costs of the resurgence of an unattended smoldering ﬁre. The crucial point
here that leads to such a requirement is that without such a negligence standard, the costs
of a burner leaving a site prematurely would likely be borne at least to some extent by a
neighboring landowner rather than the burner.
Speciﬁc negligence rules for cost-eﬀective inputs such as notiﬁcation and on-site presence
are consistent with our model, because it is unlikely that the costs of such precautions will
outweigh their expected beneﬁts (i.e. reductions in expected damage). Statutory speciﬁca-
12tion of these rules will provide a higher degree of certainty about negligence requirements,
thereby more eﬀectively inducing proper precautionary incentives and reduce transaction
costs of court proceedings.
An important characteristic of court negligence ﬁndings is that courts usually distinguish
between foreseeable factors and abnormal or unforseeable factors contributing to the spread
of ﬁre, such as abnormal changes in wind patterns (speed and direction). Our model suggests
that the probability of the ﬁre spreading to neighboring lands should be considered when
establishing negligence. This probability is in turn based in part on expectations about
exogenous factors such as wind. When deciding whether a burner started a ﬁre negligently,
courts generally base their decisions on the information burners at the time the ﬁre was
started. A burner may be found negligent if prevailing winds were unsatisfactory when the
ﬁre was lit, but generally would not found negligent for the spread of ﬁre resulting from an
abnormal and unforeseen change in the wind patterns (25 ALR5th 391).
Permits and regulatory requirements
Regulatory restrictions and permits are property rules providing landowners with the right to
burn only if they satisfy a set of requirements delineated by statute and regulatory agencies
(we ignore issues of criminal intent in this paper to focus on the law relating speciﬁcally to
productive burning). Otherwise, the burner may be subject to criminal penalties. These are
diﬀerent from liability rules, where burners have the right to perform prescribed burns but
must bear the liability associated with the burn.
Property rules for prescribed burning are imposed for two general types of activities: for
burning without a permit or contrary to permit stipulations, and for leaving a ﬁre unattended
or for negligent escape and failure to extinguish. Most states maintain a permit system
for prescribed burning under some circumstances. In some states, satisfaction of permit
requirements is necessary to avoid potential ﬁnes and other criminal penalties. To acquire a
permit, the landowner may have to show suﬃcient knowledge, preparation, and notiﬁcation
13of neighbors or public ﬁre-ﬁghting entities. Colorado’s statute, for example, states that
permits are to be issued based on the proximity of the planned burn to buildings, the
potential contribution of the ﬁre to air pollution, climatic conditions, and other related
factors. These requirements, when used in conjunction with a negligence rule, are consistent
with our model.
Coincidence of Regulation and Liability
As is the case with many environmental issues, a priori regulation and ex post liability are
used simultaneously in many states to address prescribed ﬁre externalities. The question
of whether these two instruments are used simultaneously has implications regarding the
present model and that of Kolstad et al. (1990). In particular, Kolstad et al. (1990) suggests
that if there is substantial evidentiary uncertainty or if the marginal costs of precaution
are very high, regulatory restrictions and negligence rules should be used simultaneously.
Otherwise, they should be used separately.
In order to shed some empirical light on this relationship in the context of prescribed burn-
ing, Fisher’s exact test for independence was computed to examine the correlation among
a number of measures of prior regulation and negligence rules (please note: this aspect of
the paper more than other sections is very preliminary). our sample was based on statutory
regulation and liability law for all 50 states (n=50). In the ﬁrst test, we generated a dummy
variable called REGULATION, which equals one if state laws required permits based on
explicit input requirements and zero otherwise, and another dummy variable that equals one
if the state has imposed a statutory negligence rule. We found that permit systems appeared
to be used where negligence rules were not; that is, permit systems and statutory negligence
rules appear to be used as substitutes. However, this relationship is weak, and Fisher’s exact
test failed to reject the null hypothesis of independence at any reasonable level. Similarly,
Permit systems tend to be used when strict liability rules are not, although again, the null
hypothesis of independence is not rejected.
14A new generation of prescribed ﬁre statutes
A new generation of prescribed ﬁre statutes have been developed in the southeastern states
beginning with Florida in 1990 (Brenner and Wade 1992). The Florida statute goes to great
length to recognize prescribed burning as a useful land management tool. The legislation
explicitly recognizes ecological beneﬁts, and beneﬁts from reducing the likelihood and severity
of wildﬁres. It explicitly recognizes prescribed burning as a property right, subject to a
relatively detailed set of precautionary requirements. Finally, it speciﬁes that landowners
are not liable for damage or injury caused by escaped ﬁre or smoke unless found to be grossly
negligent. Other southern states to explicitly recognize prescribed burning as a beneﬁcial
property right include Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and North Carolina. In the context
of our model, the explicit recognition of the value of prescribed burning acts to emphasize
the possibility that Ri in ﬁgure 1 is high, arguably increasing the likelihood that the Learned
Hand rule is found by the courts to be satisﬁed. The requirement of gross negligence arguably
lowers ¯ B relative to not requiring gross negligence. These statutes are therefore consistent
with an apparent attempt to reduce the likelihood of prescribed burner liability.
To the extent that reduction of fuel loads resulting from controlled burning reduces the
likelihood and severity of wildﬁres, prescribed burners may contribute positive externalities
by reducing their potential fuel contributions for wildﬁres moving across numerous landhold-
ings in a region. If this conjecture is correct, we would expect this type of statutory response
in areas where prescribed burning can reduce the total social costs of ﬁre generally (that
is, the net cost of prescribed ﬁres plus the costs of wildﬁres and their control). Although
a formal analysis of the geographic and demographic distribution of negligence rules across
states is beyond the scope of this paper, ﬁgure 2 shows that southern and paciﬁc states have
had a greater tendency to introduce negligence standards and explicit support of prescribed
burning than northern states.
15Conclusion
Prescribed ﬁre is a land management tool with long historical roots in North America,
Australia, and elsewhere, and a resurgence in interest from natural scientists, public land
managers, and legislators has led to substantial changes in the statutory law of many states
in recent years. We develop a model for comparing the relative economic eﬃciency of liability
rules, provide a summary of current statutory law relating to prescribed ﬁre in the United
States, and discuss our ﬁndings in the context of the model. Many states have adopted
statutory negligence rules despite the fact that negligence rules had already been adopted
through common law rulings. Many states have also adopted regulatory restrictions on
prescribed burning, but the two forms are not necessarily used together as Shavell (1984)
and Kolstad et al. (1990) might suggest.
Most of the recent changes in statutory law relating to prescribed ﬁre provide substantial
support for prescribed ﬁre as a land management tool despite the risks associated with its use.
Factors supporting these changes may include increasing evidence that prescribed ﬁre can be
a cost eﬀective means of controlling wildﬁres, promoting plant biodiversity, and increasing
pasture and timber productivity. Nonetheless, application of prescribed ﬁre becomes more
costly and risky with increasing suburbanization and accompanying land and land tenure
fragmentation. The incident at Los Alamos, New Mexico described at the beginning of this
article is just one illustration of these potential complications.
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